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A hot issue in development economics is how  "gainers" bencflt from perpetuating a "veil of
much to rely on user charges and private organi-  ignorance."  Most commonly, some private
zations to provide such social services as health  goods may be publicly provided and oversup-
and education.  Most analysts arguing on either  plied because they benefit a politically influen-
side of the issue assume that anv policy deci-  tial group in a nonobvious way - for example,
sions involve a tradeoff between equity and  by oversubsidizing colleges and under-iib-
efficiency.  sidizing education at lower levels.
Birdsall and James argue that in many  Birdsall and Jamcs argue for a policy that
settings in the developing world that assumption  concentrates govemment funding on public
is incorrect.  In many countries, they argue, the  goods and encourages the market to do what it
current situation is inefficient partly because it is  does best:  fund and produce private goods.
inequitable;  more equitable social spending  With public spending concentrated on services
would be more efficient in reducing mortality,  that yield public goods, the poor automatically
for cxample, or in maximizing social rctums to  benefit even if they are not targeted, and since
spending on education.  the rich also benefit they may be reluctant to
oppose these programs, even if they prefer
The model they use assumes that the degree  government spending on private services from
of efficiency and redistribution is endogenous,  which they benefit more.
so the real problem is:  How does one break into
the chain of causes and bring about a new, more  They recommend ten political strategies for
efficient and equitable cqui,ibrium, when this  reallocating government funds in the public
was apparently not in the interest of the main  sector in a way that maximizes the benefits of
actors or it would already have happened?  targeting, reduces costs, and minimizes resis-
tance to change and the withdrawal of the
If well-defined groups know they are  middle and upper classes' political and tax
"losers," they are more likely to mobili7e and  support.
foment opposition to existing policies - so the
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comments  that  we have  tried  to respond  to in this  version.An important  current  issue  in  developmert  economics  concerns  the
appropriate  degree  of reliance  on such  measures  as user  charges  for  publicly-
provided  health,  education  and  other  social  services  and  use  of the  private
sector  for  the  provision  of these  services. Proponents  of user  charges  and
greater  privatization  claim  that  these  will  conserve  scarce  public  funds  and
promote  efficiency  in  the  sense  of cost-effectiveness  and  responsiveness  to
consumer  prtferences  (Psacharopoulos,  Tan  and  Jimenez,  1986;  Akin,  Birdsall,
and  de Ferranti,  1982;  Jimenez,  1987). Opponents  retort  that,  because  of
their  reliance  on ability  to  pay  as a rationing  criterion,  user  charges  for
public  services  and  privatization  will  have  negative  distributional  effects
that  are  likely  to  outweigh  any  efficiency  gains  (e.g.  see  Gertler  et al.
1987,  and  Gertler  and  van  der  Gaag,  1988  on user  charges  for  health  care  in
Peru  and  Cote d'.voire).  Most  of tF_s  literature  implicitly  accepts  the
existence  of an efficiency-equLty  trade-off  with some  ,.eople  choosing
efficiency,  others  equity.
In this  paper  we argue  that  in  many settings  in the  developing  world,
this  presumption  of a tradeoff  between  efficiency  and  equity  is  incorrect.  we
argue  that  in  fact  in  many  countries  the  current  situation  is inefficient  in
part  because  it is  inequitable;  greater  equity  in social  spending  would  also
be  more efficient  (in  reducing  mortality,  for  example,  or in  maximizing  social
returns  to spending  on education).  Put  another  way, in  these  countries  there
exists  an identifiable  group  of efficient  reallocations  that  would
simultaneously  improve  distribution.2
Part I of this paper sets forth the theoretical reasons for
predicting that the state  will often finance a bundle of social services that
is both inefficient and inequitable --  inequitable in the sense that the upper
and middle classes rather than lower income groups will benefit therefrom.
Part II presents a variety of empirical,  examples, both from developed and
developing countries.  Part III points out some of the conceptual problems in
measuring the distributional effects of social services, problems  which in
most cases have led us to overestimate the degree to which government spending
redistributes to the poor.
The conclusion summarizes the crux of the political economy problem.
Since  we start  with a model in  which degree of efficiency and redistribution
are endogenous, the real difficulty is: How do we break into the chain of
causation and bring about a new equilibrium,  more efficient and more
redistributive,  when this  was apparently not in the interest of the main
actors, or it  would already have happened.
Section  T.  Theory
Welfare Theory
Classical welfare theory gives us a normative view of what government
should do, focusing on efficiency rather than distributional considerations.
The economic role of government is to correct market failure by funding public
goods, by subsidizing  goods that generate externalities, by compensating for
capital market or insurance  market failure, and otherwise simply to set the
framework within which private enterprise will function.  The standard
approach is to assume that the efforts of government to correct for  market
failure in themselves introduce some efficiency losses --  because those3
efforts  usually  require  taxes,  and  nondistorting  lump-sum  taxes  are  not
feasible. The  problem  is then  one  of a tradeoff  between  the  benefits  of
intervention  and  the  costs.
With respect  to distribution,  government  is  viewed  as benign  or
slightly  benevolent,  having  some  interest  in  equalizing  income  or
opportunities.  For  example,  people  cannot  be  excluded  from  public  goods,  by
definition,  so the  poor  as  well as the  rich  benefit  therefrom. (But  see  a
qualification  in Part  III  on the  point  that  they  may  value  these  benefits
differentially).  Some  welfare  theorists  go further  and  argue  that  there
exists  a set  of "merit  goods"  (health,  education)  which  society  does  not  wish
to ration  according  to  ability  to  pay;  hence  government  steps  in  on efficiency
grounds,  to impose  some  alternative  criterion  (Meade,  1964;  Rawls).
And, finally,  in  classical  welfare  theory,  the  "maximum"  point  of
social  welfare  is  acknowledged  to depend  on distribution  as  well as
efficiency.  Opinions  vary  on  whether  a "social  welfare  function"  exists,  what
an "equitable"  distribution  might  be,  and  how  much the  government  should
intervene  to alter  the  distribution  determined  by  pure  market  forces:  but
usually  the  presumption  is,  if there  is  to  be any  politically  determined
redistribution,  it should  be from  rich  to poor  and  not  vice  versa. This
"Robin  Hood"  function  of government  (see  Birdsall,  1989)  is  regarded  with some
ambivalence,  in  part  because  different  people  disagree  on the  desired
distribution  and  in  part  because  of the  standard  assumption  that  improvements
in  equity  will reduce  efficiency.  Bourgignon  (1989),  for  example,  sets  out  a
model  in  which  the  pursuit  of equity,  either  through  education  and  health
programs  that  build  human  capital,  or through  transfer  programs  such  as4
compensatory  nutrition  or food  subsidies  for  the  poor,  requires  that
government  generate  tax  revenues,  which  reduces  overall  efficiency.
In  this  paper  we examine  the  tendency  of governments  not  to play
Robin  Hood,  even  where  there  seems  to  be no tradeoff,  i.e.  where  doing  so
would increase  government  effectiveness  (efficiency)  in  the  context  of
standard  welfare  theory. We use the  terms  "equity"  and 'perverse
redistribution"  as shorthand  for "redistribution  to the  poor'  and
'redistribution  to the  rich',  respectively  (while  recognizing  that  these  are
value-laden  terms  reflecting  value  judgments  which  go beyond  the  standard  use
of terms  in  welfare  theory.)
Public  Choice  Theory
A second,  more recent  and  less  benevolent  view  of government
activities  stems  from  public  choice  theory,  which  gives  us a positive  model  of
what the  government  will do,  under  the  presumption  that  the  chief  agents  act
to  maximize  individual  utility  rather  than  social  welfare. According  to  this
theory,  politicians  do  not seek  to  maximize  efficiency  but rather  to  maximize
their  own  chances  of getting  reelected,  and individuals  use  governments  to
maximize  their  real  income  via the  creation  of protected  market  positions  and
the  direct  provision  of services  and  transfers.
Politicians  and  political  parties  have  some  discretionary  power
because  of barriers  to entry  and  because  they  are  in a  position  to shape  as
well as respond  to  peoples'  tastes. At the  same  time,  they  must  also  act  in  a
way that  deters  threats  from  potential  competitors,  hence  minimizes  campaign
costs,  and  this  limits  the  scope  of their  monopoly  power. Viewing  the  entire
spectrum  of issues,  among  which  different  groups  of  voters  have  different
trade-offs,  politicians  who survive  to  make  policy  are  those  who  assess  those5
trade-offs  correctly  and  give influential  groups  what  they  want  on issues  that
are  most salient  to them. Even  where  democracy  does  not  exist,  a similar
process  often  occurs  with  even fewer  political  checks  on the  use  of government
to benefit  the  already  powerful.
Public  policies  designed  to  benefit  powerful  interest  groups  will not
necessarily  be inefficient.  Indeed,  these  groups  would  have a  potentially
larger  pie to  capture  if the  Pareto  frontier  were reached. As one  extreme
example:  the  economy  might  operate  with  perfect  efficiency  and  poll  taxes
could  then  be imposed  on some,  transferred  to others. However,  the  allocation
of resources  resulting  from  public  choice  politics  often  is inefficient,  for
the following  reasons:
1.  In a context  of imperfect  information,  people  may not  know the
degree  and  direction  of redistribution  going  on.  If  well-defined  groups  know
they  are "losers"  they  are  more likely  to  mobilize  and  foment  opposition  to
existing  policies;  therefore  the 'gainers"  benefit  from  perpetuating  a "veil
of ignorance."  Suppose  that  efficient  transfers  are  also  more  obvious  (e.g.
transfers  in  cash  are  more  transparent  than  those  in  kind). In that  case,
efficiency  imposes  cost  to the  "gainers"  by reducing  the  amount  they  will  be
potentially  able  to extract;  they  are  therefore  likely  to choose  inefficient
mechanisms. Most  commonly,  some  private  goods  may  be publicly  provided  and
oversupplied  because  they  benefit  a politically  influential  group  of people  in
a  non-obvious  way.
2.  Our second  point  is closely  related:  imperfect  information  and
uncertainty  also surround  the  relationship  between  the  tax  structure  and  the
bundle  of  public  services  provided. While  these  may  be interdependent
components  of a long  run  political  equilibrium,  as suggested  by discussion  in6
Part  IV,  they  may appear  independent  of each  other  ia the  short  run.  In  that
case,  some  newly  demanded  public  goods,  merit  goods  or quasi-public  goods  with
large  benefits  will be  undersupplied  because  their  benefits  accrue  to  widely
dispersed,  less  influential  individuals  and  it is  uncertain  whether  the  tax
burden  of these  groups  will  eventually  be adjusted  upward  commensurately  with
their  benefits. Simila.rly,  some  goods  will  be oversupplied  because  their
chief  beneficiaries  are  politically  powerful,  if taxes  are  regarded  as fixed.
3.  The  real  costs  of publicly-produced  private  goods  may  be above
minimal  levels,  because  government  imposes  costs  of bureaucracy  and red-tape
(in  part  as a substitute  for  the  profit  motive),  often  lacks  competitive
pressures  for  internal  efficiency  (perhaps  because  politicians  reap  a surplus
from  monopolistic  provision)  and  uses  distortionary  tax  financing.
4.  The  divetsion  of entrepreneurial  energies  toward  extracting  a
surplus  from  public  agencies  rather  than  toward  productivity-enhancing  market
activities  also  impedes  private  sector  efficiency  and  growth. Thus,  not  only
are  public  resources  misallocated,  but  private  resources  are  misallocated  as
well,  as a consequence  of these  rent-seeking  activities  (Krueger,  1974:
Buchanan,  Tollison  and  Tullock,  1980).
The resulting  distribution  of real  income  will depend  upon  political
power  as well  as market  power. Political  power  of course  will vary  across
societies  and through  time  depending  on the  size  of different  producer  and
consumer  groups,  the  coaliticns  among  them,  and  the  long  run 'rules  of the
game"  that  have  been set  up (e.g.  through  constitutions)  for  allocating  voting
rights. In  this  paper  we do  not  attempt  to build  a rigorous  model  of
political  power  determination.  However,  we do argue  that  the  final
distribution  of real  income  is likely  to be considered  inequitable  by7
standards  that  many  people  hold.  For  example,  since  producer  groups  are
likely  to  be more  concentrated  and  better  organized  than  consumer  groups,  and
since  upper  and  middle  income  groups  are  probably  more  articulate  and
politically  active  than  poorer  groups,  public  choice  theory  predicts  that
producer  and  upper-middle  class  groups  will  benefit  disproportionately  from
government  policies.  (For  an early  statement  of this  point  see  Stigler,  1971
and  Peltzman,  1976).
This  is  not  to say  ULhat  there  will  be  no redistribution  to  the  poorer
classes  under  public  choice  theory. In fact,  we would  expect  to find  some
such  redistribution  on efficiency  grounds,  because  it  makes  everyone  better
off.  For  example,  people  voluntarily  donate  to  beggars  out  of  altruism  and
use  the  government  as an efficient  mechanism  for  transferring  income  to
disadvantaged  groups  through  welfare  payments,  disability  compensation,  etc.
Along  similar  lines,  the  extremes  of  poverty  and  socio-economic  immobility  may
raise  fears  of crime  or revolution  which  will ultimately  hurt the  rich;
historically,  the  provision  of  certain  merit  goods  to th:e  poor (e.g.  basic
education,  unemployment  or  medical  insurance)  has  been  viewed  as  a
particularly  effective  way of combatting  these  proLlems.
Also,  since  there  are  more  poor  people  than  rich,  the  desire  to
constrain  the  popularity  of opposition  groups  in  a democracy  leads  to some
distribution  to lower  income  groups  on grounds  of expediency.  Out-of-power
groups  must  be appeased  by giving  them "just  enough,  to  prevent  opposition
parties  from  gaining  strong  support. Expenditures  on high  quantity,  low  cost
primary  and  secondary  school  systems  are  common  examples. But "just  enough"
may  not be  very  much.  We argue  that,  in  many situations,  perverse
distributional  rather  than  efficiency  or equity  criteria  determine  the8
allocation  of government  funds,  and  these  criteria  imply  large  benefits  to
powerful  upper  income  groups,  combined  with small  redistributions  to the  poor.
(For  this  result  with respect  to public  expenditures  on education  in Brazil,
see  Behrman  and  Birdsall,  1988).
Social  Choice  about  Social  Services
The  social  service  sector  is  an arena  in  which  many  of these  forces
play  themselves  out,  as it  consists  of a variety  of quasi-public  goods  'h
different  mixes  of public  and  private  benefits  and  different  beneficiaz
The frequent  designation  of social  services  as "merit  or externality-
generating  goods"  provides  ample  justification  for  government  intervention
along  welfare  theory  lines. Yet.  once  this  intervention  begins,  ostensibly  to
correct  for  market  imperfections  and  benefit  poor  consumers,  it is  often
seized  by producer  groups  and  the  allocation  of resources  diverted  to  a more
'private"  service  mix that  predominantly  benefits  the  rich,  albeit  in a
somewhat  disguised  way,  as public  choice  th..ory  would  predict. Wnile  the
rhetoric  stresses  the  importance  of avoiding  price-rationing  in  order  to
provide  access  to the  poor  and  thereby  garner  their  support,  alternative
rationing  mechanisms  used  by the  government  may  be equally  income-biased.  If
this is  the  case,  turning  provision  of these  services  over to the  private
sector,  or reducing  public  expenditures  on these  services  by greater  reliance
on user  charges  will  not only  encourage  government  to  concentrate  on the
financing  of goods  with  a larger  'publ!. or 'merit"  component,  but  will at
the  same  time  improve  efficiency  and  combat  poverty.9
Section  II.  Empirical  Examples
In this  section  se cite  numerous  examples,  from  developed  and
developing  countries,  which  make it  clear  that  allocations  within  the  social
services  sector  often  disregard  the  tenets  of  welfare  theory  and  instead
fulfill  the  more  pessimistic  predictions  of public  choice  theory. While  these
examples  ata  not  universal,  they  are  very  widespread.  We also  suggest  the
reallocations,  involving  a shift  of some  financing  to private  sources,  that
will increase  efficiency  and  equity  at the  same  time.
The  efficiency  and  equity  criteria  discussed  in  Part  I and  used  by  us
in  Part  II deal  mainly  with the  question  of  who finances  quasi-public
services. Another  set  of efficiency  considerations  deal  with the  question  of
who  provides  these  services  and,  how  much  private  choice  and  public  controls
are  involved. For  the  distinction  and  connections  between  these  issues  see
Birdsall,  1989a  and  James,  1990. Throughout  this  paper  we focus  on the
benefits  of shifting  some  of the  financing  of quasi-public  services  to the
private  sector,  irrespective  of  whether  the  private  or  public  sector  mianages
and  provides  the  service. We also  abstract  from  the  possible  links  between
financing  and  provision  that  can  arise  in the  real  world  for  institutional  or
political  economy  reasons  (e.g.  the  amount  raised  via user  charges  may  be
greater  if  the  provider  retains  control  over  the  resources,  and  private
provision  with partial  public  subsidy  may be  more sustainable  politically  than
public  provision  with  partial  user  charges,  and  public  regulations  may
accompany  public  subsidies).
Education. Education  is a  prime  example  of a quasi-public  good,  one
which  yields  a  combination  of  private  and  external  (social)  benefits.
However,  the  mix  of public  and  private  benefits  varies  across  educational10
products. In  particular,  primary  and  secondary  education,  which  enhance  basic
literacy  and  numeric  skills,  probably  provide  larger  externalities  than
undergraduate  higher  education  and  generally  provide  a  larger  social  rate  of
return  as  well--an  efficiency  rationale  for  public  spending. Specifically,
the  average  rate  of return  in developing  countries  has  been  estimated  to  be
242  at the  primary  lev-.l,  152  at the  secondary  and  13%  at the  higher  education
level.  (Psacharopoulos,  Tan  and  Jimenez,  1986). Even  if these  rates  of
return  are  upwardly  biased  (Behrman  and  Birdsall,  1987)  the  ranking  of actual
returns  across  levels  of education  is  probably  correctly  captured. Yet,  many
countries  spend  a  disproportionate  share  of their  total  educational  budgets  at
the  tertiary  level. This  is also  the  level  which  heavily  benefits  upper
income  groups;  a large  expenditure  is  concentrated  on a small  number  of
advantaged  students  in contrast  to  primary  education  which  disproportionately
benefits  the  poor (Selowsky,  1979;  Meerman,  1979).
Public  universities  typically  do  not  have  price  barriers  to  entry.
However,  they  have academic  barriers  which  are  more likely  to  be surmounted  by
high income  families,  whose  children  complete  primary  school,  attend  a high
quality  secondary  school,  pay  for  after-school  tutoring,  and  pass  the  entrance
exam  to the  prestigious  public  institutions  (Armitage  and  Sabot,  1989;  James
and  Benjamin,  1987).
For  example,  Brazil  spends  only  9% of its  public  education  budget
(including  spending  at the  federal,  state  and  local  level)  on secondary
education,  but  23%  on higher  education  ($144  per student  on the  former,  $2536
on the  latter). Yet, 95%  of all  students  at public  universities  come  from
middle  and  high  income  families  (James,  1989a,  and  World  Bank,  1988).  In india
19%  of the  total  public  educational  budget  is  spent  on colleges  and11
universities,  while  the  majority  of rural  children  do  not  even finish  primary
school  (Tan,  1989). In  Africa  22Z  of the  public  educational  budget  is spent
on  higher  education,  attended  by only  22 of  the  relevant  age  group  (see
Psacharopoulos,  Tan  and  Jimenez,  1986  and  Winkler,  1988). In  Mexico  a person
coming  from  a  high  income  family  is  10-20  times  more likely  to attend  a public
university  than  one  coming  from  a low  income  family  (Winkler,  1988  and
Quintero,  1978). The  top  income  quintile  receives  more than  50Z  of  higher
education  subsidies  while  the  bottom  quintile  receives  less  than 10%  in Costa
Rica,  Chile,  Dominican  Republic  and  Uruguay  (Winkler,  1988  and  Petrei,  1987).
One  of the  most detailed  studies  of educational  subsidies,  for
Colombia,  showed  that  60Z  of all  higher  educational  subsidies  were received  by
the  top  income  quintile,  while  only  62  went  to the  bottom  two  quintiles,  and
these  proportions  were exactly  reversed  at the  primary  level. Overall,
educational  subsidy  per  household  was  approximately  the  same  for  all  income
groups. But  the  rich  receive  most  of  their  subsidies  from  attending
university  while  the  poor  receive  their  educational  subsidies  at the  primary
level  (Selowsky,  1979). Similarly,  in  Malaysia  50Z  of postsecondary  subsidies
were received  by the  top  quintile,  10Z  by the  bottom  two  quintiles,  the  mirror
image  of the  distribution  pattern  at the  primary  level  (Meerman,  1979).
Within  higher  education  there  is  an efficiency  rationale  for  public
funding  of research  and  graduate  training,  whether  at  public  or private
institutions.  These  are  the  activities  yielding  externalities  for society  as
a  whole,  that  will  not be funded  privately. In addition,  capital  market
failure  may  justify  public  funding  for  expensive  scientific  equipment  and
financial  aid  for  low-income  students. On the  other  hand,  at the
undergraduate  level,  private  institutions  and  private  funding  of  public12
institutions  should  be able  to  provide  instruction  in the  less-expensive  labor
intensive  fields  (liberal  arts,  law,  management)  to  middle  and  upper  class
students,  where  private  benefits  predominate  and  tuition  can  cover  the  costs.
Yet,  most pub'ic  funds  for  higher  education  are  spent  on
undergraduate  instruction  at public  colleges  and  universities  and,  as  just
noted,  most  of these  students  come  from  middle  and  upper  income  families.
Expenditures  on research  and  graduate  training  in  most  developing  countries
are  minuscule  and  only  a few  countries  have student  grants  and  loans
specifically  targeted  toward  the  poor (see  James,  1988a,  1988b,  1989;  James
and  Benjamin,  1988;  Levy,  1986). The  beneficiaries  of research  are  widely
dispersed  and  economically  disadvantaged  students  are  also  likely  to  be
politically  disadvantaged,  while  the  middle  class  clamors  effectively  for
access  to  higher  education  for  their  children. Thus,  this  allocation  of
resources  within  higher  education  is  consistent  with  the  pressure  group
predictions  of  public  choice  theory  more than  the  efficiency  or equity
rationale  of  welfare  theory.
A more  efficient  solution  would  delegate  responsibility  for
undergraduate  instruction  to  the  fee-charging  private  sector  and  fees  would  be
charged  at the  small  group  of public  institutions  as  well.  The  experience  of
many countries  has  shown  that  when the  supply  of  public  university  places  is
limited,  private  places  spring  up to accommodate  the  excess  demand. Public
funds  could  then  be reallocated  toward  the  primary  and  secondary  levels,  or
toward  research,  scientific  equipment  and  financial  aid  for  needy  students  at
the  higher  level. Moreover,  these  funds  could  be awarded,  on a competitive
basis,  both  to public  and  private  institutions.  Indeed,  elements  of this
pattern  are  found  in countries  such  as  Japan  and  Korea,  which  have  thereby13
achieved  high rates  of educational  attainment,  at low  cost  to the  public
treasury. For  example,  in  Korea  only  9Z of  the  public  educational  budget  is
spent  at the  higher  level,  but  this  is  heavily  supplemented  by private
resources  from  those  who receive  the  private  benefits  (see  Tan,  1989;  James,
1987,  1988a,  1988b;  James  and  Benjamin,  1988.)
The  private  provision  of education  is  often  criticized  on  grounds
that  it  is income-biased.  However,  as just  discussed,  public  universities  are
also  heavily  income-biased.  In income-biased  private  sectors  the  rich  pay
their  own  way,  while in income-biased  public  sectors  they  are  subsidized  by
tax  revenues  that  could  more  efficiently  be spent  in  other  ways.  Moreover,  to
mitigate  the  distributional  problem  private  universities  could  be required  to
reserve  some  specified  proportion  of  their  places  for  low income  students  and
public  student  aid  could  also  be provided  for  this  purpose.
In countries  where  the  private  sector  (often  run  by religious
organizations)  is also  the  elite,  preferred  sector  (e.g.  in  Peru,  Ecuador,
Mexico),  private  institutions  combine  both  academic  and  price  barriers  to
entry  and  are  therefore  more income-biased  than  public  institutions  (see  Levy,
1986,  Winkler,  1988  and  Quintero,  1978). But in  countries  where  the  public
sector  is relatively  elite  and  the  private  sector  accommodates  the  large
excess  demand,  academic  barriers  keep the  poor  out  of public  institutions
while  price  barriers  restrict  their  access  to  private  institutions.  As a
result,  the  two  sectors  are  roughly  equivalent  in  degree  of income-bias. For
example  in  Japan,  where  90Z  of  all  undergraduates  are  in  private  colleges  and
universities,  a student  from  a top  quintile  family  is roughly  five  times  more
likely  to attend  university  than  one  coming  from  the  bottom  income  quintile  in
both  sectors  (James  and  Benjamin,  1987  and  1988). We suspect  that  in  a14
country  such  as Brazil,  where  public  university  slots  are  heavily  rationed,
and  most students  attend  private  institutions,  the  public  institutions  are
actually  more income-biased  than  private  institutions.
In addition,  analysis  of  higher  education  enrollment  rates  across
twelve  Asian  countries  showed  these  rates  to  be  highest  in  countries  with  the
largest  private  sector  share  (James,  1989c). Apparently  the  constraints  on
quantity  stemming  from  limited  public  resources  are  greater  than  those
stemming  from  limited  private  resources.  When the  private  sector  is
encouraged,  the  latter  resources  can  be tapped. And, since  the  poor  are  much
more likely  to  have  access  to  a large  than  a small  tertiary  education  sector,
the  distributional  consequences  are  likely  to  be positive. We would  predict
that  countries  with large  private  sectors  and  high  enrollment  rates  (for
example,  Brazil.  Colombia  and  Korea)  also  have  high rates  of participation  by
the  poor.  This  shift  of  public/private  responsibilities  is  not  only
efficient,  it is  equitable  as  well.
Health. In general,  welfare  economics  criteria  would  dictate
government  expenditures  to reduce  communicable  diseases,  to  carry  out
immunization  campaigns  and  other  preventive  services,  to improve  the  water
supply,  spread  information  about  lifestyles  that  promote  good  health  (e.g.
anti-smoking,  pro-nutrition  campaigns)  and  to  provide  basic  health  services  (a
merit  good)  to (poore;)  groups  and  (rural)  regions  that  cannot  support  private
medical  services. Maternity  and  child  care  are  particularly  important
examples  of the latter  since  these  affect  the  health  of future  generations  ln
which there  should  be a large  social  interest. It is  probable  that  these
services  would raise  health  standards  and  reduce  mortality  in the  most cost
effective  way, because  they  would  touch  the  lives  of  many people  directly  and15
through the externalities they generate. (See  Birdsall, 1989b: Akin, Birdsall
and de Ferranti, 1987, Table  ,  for comparisons of the relative cost-
effectiveness of these vs. hospital services in reducing mortality.)  But,
because they have public good characteristics and many of their beneficiaries
are poor, they are noit  likely to be provided by the private market; hence they
are a logical candidate for public funding on efficiency grounds.
However, in many countries,  we observe relatively little public
health money going to these cost-effective  programs (where  government
intervention is  warranted because of private market failure) and consequently
population coverage is very limited.  Instead, a large proportion of public
health budgets is spent on hospitals, usually located in urban areas, even in
countries where the vast majority of the population lives in rural areas, with
high mortality rates caused by diseases that need not be treated in hospitals.
In Bangladesh in 1986 hospitals consumed over 80Z of recurrent  public
health spending.  In Brazil in 1982, 78Z of public health funds  were spent on
high technology hospital procedures (kidney  dialysis, coronary by-pass,
Caesarian sections) for relatively small groups of urban patients ,  at least
some of whom could afford to finance these services out of private  medical
insurance in fee-charging  hospitals.  In Zimbabwe,  which has tried to  make its
health sector  more egalitarian, two-thirds of Ministry of Health expenditures
are for hospital services and 60Z of these expenditures  were absorbed by four
hospitals in Harare.  In Tanzania, which has made a special effort to improve
rural clinics, 60Z of the recurrent  health budget  was nevertheless spent on
hospitals in 1983-84.  (These  examples are from selected years in the 1980s
from Griffin, 1989 and World Bank, 1988).16
Typically, these hospitals are located in urban centers of
population, they serve the urban middle classes, and superior public hospitals
(e.g. armed forces or social security  hospitals) serve the elites.  Since
hospital services get parcelled out to their patients, they have a large
private benefit component and could therefore be financed privately.  But once
government undertakes the task of financing hospitals, this crowds out private
resources and absorbs a large share of the public budget, because of the high
cost of modern medical technology.
Suppose instead that many hospitals were turned over to private
bodies, with fees to be covered by health insurance (which  might be
administered by the government but financed by premiums paid by the
beneficiaries or their employers).  Along similar lines, user charges could be
instituted at the remaining  public facilities.  Public funds  would then be
freed up to provide the externality-generating  health service listed above and
also to subsidize health insurance  for the poor--very likely bringing about a
net improvement in health indicators.
Examples of countries  with such experiments are Zambia, where the
university hospital at Lusaka is being turned into a parastatal that charges
clients for services,  with public funds thereby released to finance  new
maternal, child health and family planning services; Zimbabwe,  where a fee has
been introduced for patients who bypass lower levels of the health system and
those  who want a private hospital room: and Gambia, where fees charged for
drugs are turned over to village development councils for further health
improvement (Akin, Birdsall and de Ferranti, 1987).  But privatization alone
will not do the job, unless public funds are deliberately reallocated.  For
example, in Brazil about half of health care expenditures are private, many17
private  hospitals  do  exist  (702  of the  total),  and  health  maintenance
organizations  (HMOs)  privately  funded  by  workers  and their  employers  are  a
rapidly  growing  urban  phenomenon,  demonstrating  the  viability  of the  market  in
health. Nevertheless,  most of  the  public  health  funds  are spenL  on expensive
hospital  procedures  with a large  private  benefit  component,  for  upper  income
groups  (World  Bank,  1988  and  James,  1989a).
Even if  public  funding  continues,  competition  within  the  hospital
sector  and  use  of  privately  managed  facilities  might  improve  their  cost
effectiveness.  For example,  costs  declined  when  housekeeping  and food
services  at public  hospitals  were  contracted  out  to  private  firms  in  Jamaica.
In  Chile  increased  reliance  on  private  hospitals  during  the  past  decade  was
accompanied  by a shift  toward  less  expensive  medical  personnel  (more  nurses
and  midwives,  fewer  doctors),  by structural  changes  to improve  incentives,  and
by the  targeting  of government  services  toward  primary  health  care  and  other
services  for  their  poor (Griffin,  1989).
Moreover,  if  reliance  on government  funds  has limited  hospital
expansion,  access  to  private  funds  (including  insurance  reimbursement)  may
increase  hospital  services  and  thereby  improve  health  indicators,  similar  to
private  sector  expansion  in  higher  education  described  above. For  example,
this  occurred  in the  Philippines  in  the  1970s,  and  the  greatest  expansion  of
hospitals  occurred  in the  poorest  served  regions  (Griffin,  1989). Access  to
private  services  for  disadvantaged  groups  can  be further  encouraged  by
subsidizing  facilities  in low  income  regions  or by requiring  hospitals  to
retain  a specified  proportion  of their  beds  for  charity  patients.
The  availability  of  medical  insurance  plays  a key role  in  all  these
scenarios. Insurance,  of course,  raises  the  problem  of  moral  hazard,  hence18
overspending,  which  must  be addressed  or  the  efficiency  gains  just  described
will be  wiped  out.  Indeed,  uncontrolled  private  hospitals  together  with
mandatory  medical  insurance  may be the  worst  combination  of all  from  this
point  of  view.  Common  procedures  for  dealing  with this  problem  are:  requiring
co-insurance  (e.g.  an annual  deductible  and/or  a copayment  for  each
treatmerz),  exempting  small  costs  from  coverage,  paying  hospitals  on the  basis
of diagnosis  rather  than  procedures,  reviewing  recommendations  for  surgery  and
unusually  high surgical  rates,  and  structuring  in competition  among  insurance
carriers  --  in general,  greater  reliance  on  market  incentives  to contain
costs. At the  same  time,  it  must  be recognized  that  cost  escalation  in  the
health  field  is a  problem  whose  first-best  solution  has  not yet  been found  in
any  country. Perhaps  all  that  is  possible  is a second-best  solution,  in  which
the  burden  does  not fall  on the  public  treasury  or the  lowest  income  groups  in
society.
In any  event,  the  reallocation  of public  funds  to  public  goods  just
described,  together  with a shift  of responsibility  for 'private'  services  to
the  private  sector,  aided  by privately-financed  medical  insurance,  holds  out
the  promise  of raising  efficiency  and  health  standards  at the  same  time,  and
the  health  gains  should  be particularly  great  for  the  poor. Once  again,
efficiency  and  equity  seem  to  be complements  rather  than  substitutes.
Social  Security  and  Other  Social  Programs
Social  security  programs  may  be justified  on efficiency  grounds  if
the  private  discount  rate  exceeds  the  private,  so  many  people  will not
voluntarily  save  for  their  old  age.  Society  may then  make a  collective
decision  requiring  people  to  save,  to  provide  a  minimum  'safety  net"  for  all.
In  order  to provide  the  maximum  of risk  pooling,  to avoid  adverse  selection19
and to  enable  inflation  insurance,  the  compulsory  savings  may  be administered
through  a public  sociai  security  program,  as it  is in  most  countries.
This 'safety  net"  efficiency-rationale  for  social  security  would
dictate  broad  coverage  with  benefits  above  subsistence  levels  but  less  than
wages.  The  relationship  between  individual  contributions  and  pay-outs  would
vary  with life  span (the  insurance  function)  but  the  two  would  otherwise  be
closely  related,  unless  redistribution  was  an explicit  goal.  If
redistribution  was desired,  it  would  presumably  be from  rich  to poor  and  not
vice  versa.
However,  the  pattern  in  some  countries  is  quite  different. For
example,  in Brazil  social  security  covers  about  half  the  population,  mainly
urban  workers,  a  high (28Z)  proportion  of total  benefits  accrue  to  early
retirees,  many of  whom  are from  upper  income  groups,  and  their  benefits  are
initially  almost  as  high  as their  wages (in  time,  however,  the  real  value  of
benefits  declines  due  to inflation).  As a result  of these  expenditures,  for
some  recent  years  social  security  ran  a deficit  that  had to  be covered  out  of
general  tax revenues  and  is in  danger  of doing  so again.  (See  Policies  for
Reform  of  Health  Care...in  Brazil,  1988)
This is  another  instance  where  greater  reliance  on the  private  sector
(personal  saving  and supplementary  private  pension  plans  for  the  small  group
of privileged  early  retirees)  would  relieve  the  pressure  on the  public
treasury,  permit  a "safety  net"  coverage  for  the  masses,  and  hence  would  be
more  efficient  and  equitable  at the  same  time.
A similar  pattern  holds  in  housing,  where  public  funds  are  sometimes
(e.g.  in  Brazil  and  the  U.S.)  used  to subsidize  construction  or  mortgage  loans
for  middle  income  housing,  whose  benefits  are  largely  private,  while  housing20
for  the  poor remains  a  major  problem  and  the  rental  market  is distorted  by
price  controls  (see  James,  1989a). A reallocation  of public  funds  toward  more
public  goods,  while letting  the  private  market  operate  freely  to provide
private  goods  such  as  middle  class  housing  and  rental  housing  is recommended
on classical  efficiency  grounds  and  would  also  free  up resources  that  could  be
used  to benefit  the  poor.
Section  III. Measurement  Problems  and  Policy  Ambiguities
In Section  II  many examples  were given  of public  interventions  that
seemed  to  be unwarranted  on pure  efficiency  grounds  and  also  seemed  to  'iave  a
perverse  redistributional  impact. However,  it is  possible  that  these  initial
impressions  are  misleading.  Measuring  the  distributional  effects  of
government  spending  or its  private  alternatives  poses  a  host  of practical  and
conceptual  problems  that  will  be discussed  in  this  section. It  turns  out  that
most (but  not all)  of these  measurement  problems  require  corrections  that  end
up reducing  the  amount  of government  spending  that  can  properly  be considered
"redistribution  to the  poor."
Resource  Inputs  versus  Willingness  to  Pay
First,  do  we measure  the  benefits  to  different  groups  of  consumers
according  to the  real  resource  inputs  into  the  services  they  receive  or
according  to their  willingness  to  pay  for  these  services? In empirical
studies  of quasi-public  goods,  real  inputs  or physical  outputs  are  almost
invariably  used as the  measure  of  benefits  per  consumer,  since  we do  not
really  know  people's  willingness  to  pay for  goods  that  are  not rationed  by
price. For  example,  calculations  of the  distribution  of  educational  benefits21
are  typically  based  on enrollments  and  cost  per student  while  medical  benefits
are  based  on patient  days  or types  of  operations.
However,  this  understates  the  consumer  surplus  received  by the  rich
relative  to the  poor,  and  also  understates  the  relative  marginal  utility  to
upper  income  groups  of goods  whose  quantity  is  fixed  for  all (such  as  pure
public  goods). Environmental  conservation  is  a  middle  class  political  issue
for  this  reason;  the  working  class  is  relatively  more  concerned  about  jobs  and
pecuniary  income,  while  the  middle  class  is  concerned  about  clean  air.
Because  of the  positive  income  elasticity  of demand,  the  rich  will benefit
more than  the  poor from  (in  terms  of  willingness  to pay  for)  each  consump.io:I
unit  of normal  goods,  and  conventional  measures  of benefit  (e.g.  proportion  of
enrollments  or  medical  operations)  therefore  understate  the  income  bias
inherent  in  public  spending  and  overstate  its  redistribution  toward  the  poor.
Consumers  versus  Producers
Redistribution  to  the  poor is  overstated  for  a second  reason  as  well.
Some  of the  benefits  of government  spending  for  social  services  undoubtedly
accrue  to producers,  and  the  producers  are  often  from  higher  income  groups
than  are  consumers.
For  example,  in  many countries  increases  in  public  spending  on
primary  and  secondary  education  are  mainly  captur?d  by middle  class  teachers,
in the  form  of higher  salaries,  rather  than  raising  the  quantity  or quality  of
education. Along  similar  lines,  teacher  salaries  are  usually  much lower  in
private  schools  but  when subsidies  are  granted  these  salaries  rise  to  public
school  levels. Indeed,  this  is often  the  raison  d'etre  for  the  subsidies.
(See  James,  1990).22
Teachers  are  an articulate  group  better  organized  than  consumers  and
taxpayers,  and  their  unions  are  politically  skillful  at pressing  governments
to raise  spending  and  salaries. The  fact  that  publicly  financed  schools  are
shielded  from  market  pressures  gives  unions  and  other  professional  groups  more
power  than  they  would  have in  competitive  private  markets. If the  higher
salaries  teachers  thereby  attain  attract  a  more qualified  teaching  staff  this
represents  a real  cost  of quality,  not  a transfer  or rent.  But  if the  same
teaching  staff  remains,  at a  higher  salary,  a redistribution  occurs,  from
society  at large  to  the  producers  rather  than  the  consumers  of education. If
producers  of publicly  funded  social  services  receive  rents,  conventional
measures  which  assume  that  inputs  are  being  paid  their  opportunity  cost
understate  the  benefits  of government  spending  that  accrue  to the  middle  and
upper  classes  and  overstate  the  real  resource  inputs  that  accrue  to lower
income  groups  (consumers).
Difference  Between  Distribution  of Benefits  and  Redistribution  of  Real Income
Our  third  point  potentially  works  in the  opposite  direction:  it is
possible  that  the  rich  receive  a  disproportionate  share  of  benefits,  yet  the
service  may still  be redistributive  because  they  pay  an even  larger  share  of
the  tax  bill.  This  effect  is  probably  more likely  to pertain  in  developed
than  in developing  countries,  since  in  the  latter  tax  systems  are  often
regressive  or  proportional  rather  than  progressive.
Measuring  the  distribution  of the  tax  burden  is  made difficult  'y the
fact  that  the  initial  incidence  is  often  quite  different  from  the  final
impact,  once  shifting  to  consumers  and/or  workers  is  taker.  into  account. Most
empirical  studies,  therefore,  deal  only  with initial  incidence  --  and  even
this  cannot  be determined  with  precision. In studies  of  American  and  Japanese23
higher  education,  benefits  are  always  skewed  toward  the  upper  classes  but
taxes  appear  to  be even  more  skewed  so  higher  education  is  still,  in  most
cases,  moderately  redistributive.  The  Japanese  public  system  is  more
redistributive  than  most  U.S. state  university  systems  because  the  state  sales
and  property  taxes  which  are  used  to  finance  higher  education  in  the  U.S.  are
less  progressive  than  the  national  income  tax  system  which  is  used to  finance
universities  in  Japan, However,  the  community  college  system  in the  U.S.  is
the  most redistributive  of  all,  because  its  students  come  disproportionately
frcm  low  income  groups  (see  James  and  Benjamin,  1987  and  1988).
In Selowsky's  study  of the  distribution  of  health,  education  and
other  social  services  in  Colombia,  the  upper  income  groups  received  larger
benefits  but the  benefit  distribution  was not  nearly  as skewed  as the
distribution  of income  and  taxes;  hence  the  overall  effect  of governmental
spending  and  taxation  was  mildly  redistributive  toward  the  poor (Selowsky,
1979).
In  Brazil  the  bottom  income  quintile  receives  7Z  of total  social
benefits  while  the  top  quintile  receives  41Z.  This  is  certainly  an income-
biased  pattern  of  benefits. If the  tax  system  were progressive  or
proportional  the  net  impact  would  nevertheless  be redistributive  toward  the
poor,  since  income  is  even  more skewed  (see  World  Bank,  1988). However,  the
Brazilian  tax  system  is probably  regressive,  because  of the  preponderance  of
payroll  taxes,  the  flat  rate  structure,  the  poor  coverage  and  the  existence  of
hidden  subsidized  and  tax  credits  (World  Bank,  1989). Therefore,  it is  not  at
all  clear  that  the  public  provision  of social  services  increases  the  real
welfare  of the lowest  income  groups,  on  balance. At the  same  time,  there  is
probably  a redistribution  to the  poorer  regions. For  example,  social  security24
benefits  urban  areas  more than  rural  areas  but  the  former  are  also  taxed  more
regularly  and  heavily  for  social  security. Although  the  rich  Southeastern
part  of the  country  gets  a disproportionate  share  of social  security  and
medical  benefits  residents  of that  region  pay  an even  larger  share  of taxes,
so on  balance  the  system  redistributes  to  the  poor  Northeast  (see  World  Bank,
1988). This  is consistent  with  predictions  from  public  choice  theory  that
influential  middle  and  upper  income  groups  will benefit  disproportionately
from  public  spending,  but  some  redistrib3ution  to  poor  groups  or regions  will
nevertheless  take  place.
Social  Insurance  versus  Redistribution
Fourth,  many  programs  that  look  redistributive  from  an ex post (or
transitory  income)  point  of  view  are  really  insurance  from  an ex ante (or
permanent  income)  point  of view. For  example,  unemployment  or disability
compensation  are received  by groups  with lower  temporary  income,  but  much  of
this  transfer  is  an insurance  pay-off  in  exchange  for  the  earlier  payment  of
insurance  premiums  by these  same  groups. It represents  a smoothing  or
maintenance  rather  than  a redistribution  of expected  lifetime  income.
Redistribution  is correctly  measured  by the  difference  between  premiums  paid
and  expected  insurance  returns  which  may be  positive  for  some  and  negative  for
others  but  is far  less  than  total  transfers  for  all.
We digress  for  a moment  to  comment  on the  relationship  between  social
insurance  and  redistribution.  All social  insurance  programs  have  some
elements  of risk-pooling  and  some  elements  of redistribution,  since  some
people  are  actuarially  more  vulnerable  than  others  but in  a public  program
premiums  are  constrained  to  be relatively  uniform  and  do not reflect
differential  riskiness. Indeed,  one  reason  for  operating  such  insurance25
programs  as a  public  monopoly  is to  prevent  opting  out  and  adverse  selection,
thereby  permitting  some  redistribution  to take  place. In homogeneous
societies  the  insurance  element  predominates  whereas  in  heterogeneous
societies  definable  groups  may  have large  differences  in riskiness  that  are
not reflected  in  differential  premiums;  hence  the  redistributive  component
grows.
Groups  that  are  being  "redistributed  away  from"  will oppose  a  high
level  of social  insurance,  since  they  do not  get  an actuarially  fair  return,
and  will favor  a  voluntary  privatized  system. If  these  groups  are  poli.tically
influential,  it follows  that  heterogeneous  societies  are likely  to  have less
social  insurance,  which  is  necessarily  tied  together  with redistribution  in
these  societies.  Unfortunately,  private  insurance  markets  may  also  be  non-
sustainable  because  of adverse  selection  and/or  the  need for  large-scale  risk-
pooling  (e.g.  to  cover  catastrophic  risks). So,  these  societies  may  end  up
with individuals  bearing  a high  degree  of risk. The  U.S.  is an  example  of
such  a society;  it  would  be useful  to test  this  hypothesis  about  the  inverse
relationship  between  heterogeneity  and  social  insurance  across  a ldrger  set  of
countries.
The  political  pressures  against  social  insurance  just  described  are
mitigated  by the  fact  that,  for  any  given  level  of insurance,  middle  and  upper
income  groups  usually  find  ways to get  a larger  share  of benefits  than  their
actual  life  experience  warrants,  whereas  low  income  groups  do not  receive  all
the  benefits  to  which  they  are  entitled  (because  they  do not  know  all  the
rules  or all the  ways around  the  rules).
In  measuring  the  redistributive  effects  of these  programs,  then,  one
must first  eliminate  the  part that  represents  insurance,  in the  sense  that26
actuarially fair premiums have been paid on the basis of demographic
characteristics; and second one must take account of the fact that some groups
systematically receive less than their formal characteristics  would suggest.
Both these adjustments lead to the conclusion that  r.,any  programs overstate the
degree to which they redistribute to the poor.
Life Cycle Income Shifts
Closely related, some programs that appear to be redistributive
merely shift income from one stage of the life  cycle to another.  For example,
social security is sometimes thought of as a payment to low income retirees
but, to the extent it is actuarially fair,  merely represents compulsory
savings  when young to finance  consumption  when older and not working.  Thus,
it is less redistributive to the poor from a life cycle than from a static
cross-sectional point of view.  Indeed, in some countries people with high
lifetime incomes (albeit relatively low current incomes) receive a
disproportionate share of total benefits so the net redistribution  may
actually be perverse.  In Brazil, for example, the poor are much less likely
to benefit from pension benefits since they are less able to demonstrate the
minimum necessary number of years of continuous attachment to the labor force.
In 1986, 28? of benefits were absorbed by early retirees in Brazil, who
represented just 92 of all recipients, and relatively few of these were poor
(World  Bank, 1988b).
Another example of a life cycle effect (which  creates the opposite
kind of distortion) concerns the provision of public education.  We may think
of people as paying for public education throughout their working lives but
receiving the benefits at particular points in time, a life cycle shift in
real income.  Primary school students usually have young parents, whose27
current  income  understates  their  lifetime  income,  while  university  students
have  middle-aged  parents  whose  income  is at  the  life  cycle  peak. University
education,  of course,  is  much  more  expensive  than  primary  education. Thus,  if
we examine  data  based  on the  populaticit  as  a  whole,  it  may  appear  that  high
income  families  are  disproportionately  receiving  the  benefits  from  public
educational  spending,  particularly  from  high  cost  public  universities,  but  in
part  this  is due  to the  relationship  between  income  and  age,  not the
educational  access  of different  lifetime  groups. Higher  education
distribution  figures  which  do  not  adjust  for  this  life  cycle  view  will
systematically  understate  the  benefits  received  by low  income  families. Even
if  there  were  no income  bias  of  enrollments  within  a given  cohort  based  on
lifetime  income,  there  would  appear  to be one  because  the  entire  cohort  is  at
a high  point  in its  life  cycle  income,  relative  to the  population  as a  whole.
A more  appropriate  set  of data  would  compare  lifetime  taxes  paid  and
benefits  received  by different  groups  within  a given  age  cohort. As one
example:  when this  calculation  was carried  out  for  the  case  of public
universities  in  Japan  and  the  U.S.  it increased  the  lifetime  cohort  tax  shares
of lower  income  groups  but increased  their  enrollment  shares  still  more,  so
the  income  bias  in enrollments  was  cut  in  half (e.g.  the ratio  of enrollments
from  top  relative  to  bottom  quintiles  fell  from  5.8  to 2.6  in  Japan,  from  4.5
to  2.4  in  California)  and  the  redistribution  from  rich  to poor  became  much
more  marked  (see  James  and  Benjamin,  1987  & 1988).
Taste  Change  and  Information
Some  public  programs  involve  information  and  taste  change  (e.g.
public  spending  on anti-smoking  or anti-cholesterol  campaigns). If tastes
have  been  changed,  do  we measure  benefits  in terms  of ex ante  or ex  post28
preferences?  Or do  we impose  external  "objective"  benefit  criteria,  contrary
to  the  usual  subjective  approach  in  welfare  economics?
It  may  well be  more  difficult  and/or  costly  to deliver  information  to
and  change  the  tastes  of the  poor,  particularly  the  rural  and  uneducated  poor.
so their  preferences  and  behavior  may remain  unchanged. In contrast,
wealthier  and  more  educated  people  are  better  able  to receive  and  absorb
information,  unless  special  efforts  are  made  to target  it toward  low  income
communities. The  gains  in  terms  of reducing  mortality  rates  and  incidence  of
illness  may  be greater  if information  is targeted  toward  the  poor. However,
in  terms  of willingness  to  pay,  the  poor  may  not  place  a  high  value  on public
health  campaigns  because  they  are  slow  to acquire  information  and  their  tastes
are slow  to change.
In this  sense,  information  and  taste-changing  activities  are  quasi-
public  (rather  than  pure  public  goods)  that  get  parcelled  out  between  upper  or
lower  income  groups,  the  former  are  more  likely  to  benefit  unless  special
steps  are taken  to offset  their  higher  productivity  in assimilating
information,  and  conventional  measures  of distribution  are  unlikely  to capture
these  biases.
Section  IV.  Political  Strategies
In this  paper  we have  argued  for  a  policy  which  concentrates
government  funding  on public  goods  and  encourages  the  market  to do  what it  can
do best--fund  and  produce  private  goods. A drift  away  from  this  policy  in the
social  service  sector  of  many  developing  countries  in recent  years  has  had,  we
believe,  negative  distributional  as  well as  efficiency  consequences.  W4hile
efficiency  and  equity  objectives  do  not  always  lead  to the  same  set  of29
actions,  numerous  examples  given  above  suggest  they  do coincide  in the
education  and  health  sectors  of many  countries  today. These  actions  usually
involve  increased  financial  responsibilities  for  the  private  sector,  combined
with a reallocation  of government  funds  within  the  public  sector.
In the  absence  of political  change,  however,  the  shift  we are
proposing  will  not  be easy  to  accomplish,  since  the  current  situation  has  come
about  precisely  because  people  with  political  power  have felt  they  could
benefit  therefrom  and  will resist  relinquishing  this  source  of real  income.
It is important  to remember  that  the  current  situation  is the  result  of  an
equilibrium,  in  which  each  group  is  maximizing  the  utility  it can  extract  from
the  political  system. In  this  equilibrium,  each  group  with political  power
gets some  pay-off:  the  rich  get  university  education  and superior  hospitals
while  the  poor  get  primary  schools  and sometimes  rural  health  clinics. In
many cases  it  appears  that  upper  income  groups  get  a  disproportionate  share  of
benefits,  but since  they  also  pay  more taxes,  on  balance  there  is often  a
modest  redistribution  to the  poor.  If  we now  disturb  one  element  of this
equilibrium,  other  elements  will  change  as a reaction,  so  that  the  end result
may be quite  different  from  the  initial  step.
For example,  suppose  the  upper  classes  feel  their  benefits  have
declined  when a shift  is  made from  funding  private  to public  goods  by
government  (e.g.  from  financing  medical  operations  to financing  malaria
control  and  immunization  campaigns);  they  may  then  lobby  successfully  for  a
corresponding  tax  cut, so  that  government  has  less  to spend,  or for  a shift  in
the  structure  of taxes,  so  that  relatively  more is collected  from  the  lower
classes. (Tax  cuts  in the  Reagan  years  in the  U.S.  could  thus  be viewed  as  a
reaction  to the  build  up of poverty  programs  in  the  1960s  and  early  1970s,30
beyond  those  of the  New  Deal  years,  though  other  factors  obviously  also
contributed).
Along  similar  lines,  suppose  that  undergraduates  from  high  income
families  are  charged  higher  fees  for  access  to superior  public  universities,
in an  attempt  to capture  private  revenues  for  the  private  benefits  they
receive. They  may respond  by switching  to the  private  sector  and  withdrawing
their  political  support  from  the  public  sector  facilities.  Thus,  both the
student  mix  and  the  resources  available  to superior  public  universities  may
change;  and  by the  final  equilibrium  they  may  no longer  be superior. In
formulating  public  policy,  this  chain  of responses  leading  to a  new  political
equilibrium  must  be taken  into  account.
Pragmatically,  one  may  have  to  choose  between  a smaller  public  budget
targeted  toward  the  poor  versus  a larger  public  budget  with  benefits  accruing
to the  rich,  between  a  benefit  pattern  that  is  biased  toward  the  rich  but  also
financed  by them  on the  basis  of progressive  or proportional  taxation,  versus
a  more egalitarian  distribution  of services  financed  by a  more regressive  tax
system. (For  a  discussion  of the  political  equilibrium  in  Japan  and  the
reactions  to educational  reform  that  restored  an unexpected  new  equilibrium,
see  James,  1986;  James  and  Benjamin,  1988).
Ultimately,  large  changes  in  the  distribution  of benefits  from
government  spending  will only  occur  if there  is  a corresponding  change  in the
distribution  of political  power. For  example,  as the  urban  working  class  grew
in size  and  became  enfranchised  in  nineteenth  and  twentieth  century  Europe,
they  also  acquired  greater  power  to influence  government  policies. It is
possible  that  enfranchisement  of black  voters  in  the  U.S. South,  beginning
with the  Civil  Rights  Act  of 1964,  has gradually  increased  the  access  of31
blacks  to the  benefits  of state-sponsored  social  programs. Obviously,  these
changes  in internal  power  structure  are  very  slow  and  difficult  to achieve.
On the  other  hand,  a temporary  change  in  power  can  sometimes  be multiplied  and
become  permanent  if it is  used  to  alter  the  long  run  rules  of the  game  via
constitutional  change,  precedent-setting  judicial  interpretations,
irreversible  extensions  of voting  rights,  reapportionment,  etc. All  these
elements  were present  in the  two  examples  given  above. Some  now  argue
(Nelson,  1989)  that  re-deraocratization  in  Latin  America  will increase  the
political  influence  of the  urban  working  poor  --  who  may then  use  this  power
to increase  their  share  of social  benefits  (though  this  would  not  affect  the
rural  poor).
While  the  above  comments  sound  pessimistic,  there  are  a few  sources
of hope.  First,  as discussed  in  Part  I,  many  of the  inefficient  inequitable
policies  we have  been  discussing  are  stimulated  and  perpetuated  by imperfect
information.  The "losers"  do  not  always  know  how  much they  are losing  and  thd
"winners"  incur  costs  to  hide information  from  them. Spreading  more  accurate
information  may then  alter  the  feasible  political  equilibrium.  Along  similar
lines,  politicians  do not  know  peoples'  preferences  or the  intensity  of these
preferences  with certainty,  and  if their  perceptions  of preferences  are
changed,  the  policies  they  deem  politically  optimal  will also  change. Given
the  current  fiscal  crisis  in  many countries,  politicians  may  be more  willing
to consider  cost-effective  reallocations.
Third,  the  realignment  of  public  and  private  responsibilities  that  we
have  been  discussing  constitutes  a move  toward  efficiency,  thereby  generating
a productive  surplus  which  can,  at least  theoretically,  make everyone  better
off.  If  the surplus  is  distributed  in  such  a  way  that  there  are  more  winners32
than  losers,  including  influential  winners,  this  should  help  to offset  the
political  resistance  to  change. The  political  strategy  to  follow,  then,  is
one  of slow  increases  in  equity,  with  many  groups  benefitting  but  the  poor
benefitting  most  of all.
Finally,  the  power  structure  may be changed  through  the  intervention
of external  actors  such  as local  and  international  NGOs (non-profit  non
governmental  organizaticns),  the  World  Bank  and  other  aid  agencies  --although
the  scope  for  action  here  is obviously  limited.
Examples  of policies  that  might  be adopted  to facilitate  change  are:
1.  Concerned  internal  andlor  external  actors  could  initiate  a
citizens'  education  campaign,  which  makes  it  clear  to lower  income  groups  that
their  needs  are  not  being  met and  to the  middle  and  upper  income  groups  that
if  changes  are  not  implemented,  the  country  as a  whole  will face  increasing
costs  in the  future,  much  of  which  they  will  have to  pay.  Examples  of these
costs  are  higher  taxes,  higher  social  security  premiums,  slower  income  growth,
environmental  problems,  crime  and  political  instability.
2.  If changes  such  as  cost  recovery  schemes  are  planned  for  the
public  sector,  the  current  cohort  of  consumers  shotuld  be exempted  as  much  as
possible. For  example,  students  currently  in  public  universities  should
probably  be exempted  from  large  fee  increases,  and  fees  should  be gradually
phased  in for  new  cohorts,  to  minimize  the  risk  for  politicians.
3.  Rather  than  withdrawing  entirely  from  a service  area (such  as
higher  education  or hospitals)  in  many instances  governments  should  simply
halt future  expansion,  leaving  further  increases  in  demand  to be accommodated
by the  private  sector. This  too  should  minimize  opposition  among  consumer
groups.33
4.  Governments  should  be cautioned  about  starting  up  new  service
areas,  unless  they  meet  a stringent  public  good  test. It is  easier  not  to
start  than  to  cut  off  services  already  being  provided. New  social  programs
should  be carefully  scrutinized  and  should  not  be  undertaken  by the  government
unless  it  is clear  1) that  they  have  a  high social  rate  of return,  2)  will  not
be undertaken  by the  private  market  and  3)  do not  have  perverse  distributional
effects.
5.  On the  other  hand,  government  spending  should  be encouraged  for
social  services  that  yield  a large  public  good  component. If  new spending  is
concentrated  on public  goods,  the  poor  will  automatically  benefit  even  if they
are  not  targeted. And since  the  rich  also  benefit  they  be reluctant  to  oppose
these  programs,  even  though  they  prefer  government  spending  on other  (private)
services  from  which  their  benefits  are larger.
6.  Where  targeting  is done,  it is  probably  more effective  to do so
by region  (although  incentives  for  migration  pose  a problem)  or by easily
identifiable  population  groups  (pregnant  women  and  young  children)  or  by
subsidizing  goods  that  the  poor  are likely  to  consume  (e.g.  certain  foods  or
community  colleges)  rather  than  by  means-testing  and  earmarking  of
individuals,  which  has  high  administrative  and  political  costs.
7.  Moreover,  a distributional  impact  analysis  can  be  made (and
publicized)  of different  services,  locations,  and  methods  of  delivery,  bearing
in  mind  that  they  will be  more  politically  stable  if the  broad  middle  class
also  participates.  For  example,  if  public  provision  of  pre-schools  is
expanded,  they  are likely  to be  used  primarily  by  middle  and  upper  income
families. But  if low  socio-economic  neighborhoods  are selected,  the  clientele
will  change  accordingly. If these  services  are  targeted  strictly  toward  the34
poor,  they  are  unlikely  to receive  enough  political  support  for  a high  level
of quantity  and  quality,  and  will  be subject  to cut-backs  during  periods  of
fiscal  stringency,  as indicated  by evidence  from  the  U.K.,  Sri  Lanka,  and
other  countries  (see  Goodin  and  LeGrand,  1987:  Besley  and  Kanbur,  1988).
Those  shared  with the  middle  classes  are  more likely  to be preserved,  which
may  be one  reason  why the  poor  have  not  been  more  vociferous  in seeking
targeted  programs. An open  discussion  of  distributional  impacts  and  choices
may itself  change  the  feasible  political  equilibrium.
8.  Even  where funding  responsibility  is  retained  by government,
economies  of competition  may  be attained  if  production  and  management
respon,sibilities  are  shifted  to the  private  sector  (as  in  contracting  out
schemes,  done  on a competitive  basis,  or if  market  approaches  are  introduced
into  the  public  sector  (as  in  voucher  schemes  where  funds  follow  students  or
patients  within  public  institutions).  These  market  elements  should  cut  down
on rents  that  often  have  a perverse  distributional  effect,  and  should  generate
a surplus  that  can  be spent  in  a  more  egalitarian  manner. Once  these
possibilities  are  put  on the  agenda  they  may themselves  generate  new
constitutions  and  coalitions  (e.g.  from  private  sector  organizations)  that
alter  the  political  equilibrium  --  agenda-setting  is thus  a  powerful  tool.
9.  Another  way of economizing  on  costs,  hence  permitting  greater
quantity  for  any  given  budget,  is to  give  modest  subsidies  to NGOs  that
provide  services  to disadvantaged  communities  and  are  able to  draw  on
donations  of money,  volunteer  and  quasi-volunteer  labor. Perhaps  more
important,  NGO  advocacy  groups  might  be  used to  play  an important  role  as
informational  conduits  to disadvantaged  groups  and  as grassroots  organizations
informing  politicians  of  consumer  preferences  and  stimulating  the  government35
to act.  (This  is the  role  they  play,  for  example,  in Sweden,  where  they  are
built  into  the  political  process;  see  James,  1989). NGOs,  thus,  can  help
change  the  balance  of  political  power,  which  is  both  a reason  why some  groups
support  them  and  why  many influential  groups  oppose  them.
10.  Any structural  or other  major  policy  change  involves
trarsactions  and  transitional  costs. By covering  these  costs,  in  projects
that  are  conditioned  on efficiency  and  equity  improvements,  World  Bank  loans
can  help to  diminish  the  resistanice  to  change.36
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